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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 10-3161
___________
SHANNON BOWMAN,
Appellant
v.
SENIOR CORRECTIONAL OFFICER MAZUR;
DR. DANIEL LEONARD, Clinical Director;
WARDEN J. YOST
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 08-cv-00173 )
District Judge: Honorable Kim R. Gibson
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 9, 2011
Before: AMBRO, HARDIMAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 6, 2011)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Pro se appellant, Shannon Bowman, appeals from the order of the United States
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania entering judgment in favor of

appellees and dismissing his complaint. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the
District Court‟s judgment.
I.
Since the facts underlying the instant appeal are well-known to the parties, only a
summary is provided here. In August 2008, Bowman, a prisoner currently housed at
USP-Terre Haute, submitted a complaint in the United States District Court raising a
claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971). Bowman, who is a diabetic, apparently experienced a hypoglycemic
event (e.g., shaking in bed) on January 2, 2007, while housed in the Segregated Housing
Unit (“SHU”) at FCI-Loretto. Corrections Officer Mazur brought food to Bowman‟s cell
to address his low blood sugar. Unfortunately, Bowman fell while getting off of the top
bunk to get the food and injured himself. Bowman alleges that Officer Mazur, Dr. Daniel
Leonard, the Clinical Director at FCI-Loretto, and Warden J. Yost (collectively referred
to as the “BOP Appellees”) ignored the fact that he was medically entitled to a bottom
bunk, and thus violated his Eighth Amendment right by their deliberate indifference in
assigning him to a top bunk when he was placed in the SHU on December 21, 2006.
Bowman claims that he suffered a “severe back injury” as a result of the fall, and sought
in excess of $2,000,000 in compensatory and punitive damages.
After the close of discovery, the BOP Appellees filed a motion for summary
judgment together with a brief and concise statement of material facts in support. After
having been granted an extension of time, Bowman filed his response and opposition.
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The Magistrate Judge to whom the complaint was referred thereafter issued a Report and
Recommendation that the BOP Appellees‟ motion for summary judgment be granted.
The Magistrate Judge initially concluded that summary judgment in favor of the BOP
Appellees was warranted on account of Bowman‟s failure to dispute their statement of
material facts. Despite having provided Bowman a directive regarding his need to
comply with Local Rule 56.1.C.1 and comprehensive instructions on how to go about
fulfilling that obligation, Bowman nonetheless failed to cite to specific portions of the
record in support of his responsive concise statement of fact. The Magistrate Judge thus
concluded that Bowman failed to create a genuine issue of material fact with respect to
the BOP Appellees‟ record evidence that they lacked the deliberate indifference mindset
required by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994), to make out an Eighth
Amendment claim.
The Magistrate Judge further determined that, even accepting Bowman‟s
statement of material facts and denials as true, the BOP Appellees were nonetheless
entitled to summary judgment. The Magistrate Judge concluded that there was no
evidence in the record to establish the subjective prong of an Eighth Amendment claim
given Bowman‟s failure to show that defendants knew he had a “lower bunk restriction”
and/or believed that such a restriction was medically necessary.
Over Bowman‟s objections, the District Court adopted the Report and
Recommendation. The District Court rejected Bowman‟s excuse that a lack of
understanding of the court‟s local rules resulted in his deficient response to the BOP
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Appellees‟ concise statement of material facts. The court thus found no unfairness in the
Magistrate Judge‟s recommendation that summary judgment be granted in favor of the
BOP Appellees based on Bowman‟s failure to comply with Local Rule 56.C., nor did the
court find any error in the Magistrate Judge‟s alternative merits analysis. Accordingly, it
adopted the Report and Recommendation as the opinion of the court, and granted
summary judgment in favor of the BOP Appellees. This timely appeal followed.
II.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the District
Court‟s grant of summary judgment is plenary and we must affirm if there is no genuine
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). “Where the record taken as a
whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no
genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
587 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact is one that could change the outcome of the
litigation. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
After a careful review of the record and the parties‟ briefs on appeal, we discern
no error in the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment in favor of the BOP
Appellees. As noted previously, because Bowman failed to file a proper response to the
BOP Appellees‟ statement of material facts in accordance with the District Court‟s Local
Rule of Court 56.C, the District Court deemed Appellees‟ statement of material facts to
be admitted pursuant to its Local Rule of Court 56.E. We have recognized that such a
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local rule is permissible so long as the District Court also conducts a merits review and
renders a finding that judgment for the moving party is “appropriate” in accordance with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. See Anchorage Assocs. v. V.I. Bd. of Tax Review,
922 F.2d 168, 175 (3d Cir. 1990). Because the District Court conducted a merits analysis
and Bowman has not challenged this aspect of the District Court‟s decision, we will not
disturb its decision to deem the BOP Appellees‟ statement of material facts as
undisputed.1
This determination is actually of little import in the instant case, however, as we
agree with the District Court‟s conclusion that, even accepting Bowman‟s responsive
statements and denials themselves as true, the record in this case is woefully deficient of
any evidence indicating that the BOP Appellees acted with deliberate indifference in
assigning him to a top bunk in the RHU. The principles for establishing a prisoner‟s
Eighth Amendment claim were established by the Supreme Court in Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97 (1976), and Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), and require a prisoner

1

Even affording Bowman‟s filings a liberal construction, we conclude that any such
challenge has been waived insofar as it has not been so much as mentioned in his pro se
informal opening brief. An appellant is “required to set forth the issues raised on appeal
and to present an argument in support of those issues in [his] opening brief.” Kost v.
Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993); see Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(5), (9). “It is
well settled that an appellant‟s failure to identify or argue an issue in his opening brief
constitutes waiver of that issue on appeal.” United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222
(3d Cir. 2005). The instant appeal presents no circumstances which counsel against
application of that rule. See, e.g., Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir.
2008) (per curiam) (“While we read briefs filed by pro se litigants liberally, issues not
briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned.” (internal citations
omitted)).
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to allege a sufficiently serious medical need – the objective component – and deliberate
indifference by prison officials in response to that need – the subjective component.
The BOP Appellees do not dispute that Bowman‟s insulin-dependent diabetic
condition amounts to a serious medical need within the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment, see Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir.
2003), and Bowman has been receiving care for that condition during his period of
incarceration. The BOP Appellees also do not dispute that a “lower bunk” pass, which
had been issued back in September 2002 in response to Bowman‟s complaints of frequent
night-time urination, was eventually located in Bowman‟s medical file during the
administrative appeal process that subsequently took place. The record is, however,
deficient of evidence demonstrating that the BOP Appellees were deliberately indifferent
to a medical need associated with Bowman‟s diabetic condition when they failed to
assign him to a lower bunk upon his transfer to the SHU more than four years after the
issuance of that lower bunk restriction.
In addition to Dr. Leonard‟s understanding that there is no medical policy
requiring diabetics to have a bottom bunk assignment and no awareness on his part that
Bowman‟s diabetic condition made a bottom bunk a medical necessity at the time of the
January 2007 incident, see Appellees‟ Supp. App. at 73, 85, 100, the BOP Appellees
stated that Bowman‟s file had been searched upon his request for a lower bunk
assignment and no such pass was found. See Supp. App. at 121. Even if Dr. Leonard
was negligent in failing to see the possibility that Bowman‟s condition carried with it the
6

need for a bottom bunk assignment in 2006-2007, “[i]t is well-settled that claims of
negligence or medical malpractice, without some more culpable state of mind, do not
constitute „deliberate indifference.‟” Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).
Additionally, we cannot say that Appellees Mazur and Yost were deliberately indifferent
to Bowman‟s need for a bottom bunk restriction as a result of, perhaps, their mere
negligence in searching his prison file, especially where his treating physician was of the
opinion that no such restriction was medically necessary. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d
218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004). Accordingly, the grant of summary judgment was appropriate.
III.
Based on the foregoing, we will affirm the District Court‟s judgment.2

2

Bowman‟s motion to amend the complaint is denied.
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